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Abstract
We build a dynamic trade model to study how international unbundling of production
and the emergence of global supply chains affect the world income distribution. We con-
sider a world where countries only differ in their productivity. The level of productivity
determines the number of varieties a country produces. To manufacture each variety a
bundle of intermediates, which require capital and labor in different proportions, needs
to be assembled. We characterize two trade regimes: (i) trade only in varieties and
(ii) trade in both varieties and intermediates (unbundling). We show that unbundling
of production generates income divergence among ex-ante identical countries (symmetry
breaking). With heterogeneous countries, it increases top-bottom inequality and it has
non-monotonic effects on the world income distribution (it reduces relatively more the
income share of middle-productivity countries). Unbundling of production also increases
within-country inequality in all countries. We also show that when the South joins the
global supply chain, the income share of all northern and the most productive south-
ern countries increase, at the expense of the least productive countries. In addition, we
find that the effect of a labor-saving technology, computerization, depends on the trade
regime. Without unbundling, computerization has no effect on the world income distri-
bution. With unbundling, computerization raises world inequality. Finally, we show that
technology diffusion leads to income convergence under both trade regimes. However,
with unbundling of production more low-productivity countries benefit from technological
catch-up.
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1 Introduction
One of the most remarkable facts in international trade in the last twenty-five years has been
the “unbundling” of production (Baldwin, 2012). Before the 1990s, the production process
was much less fragmented across the globe. The unbundling of production has made possible
the emergence of “global supply chains,” whereby the production of a significant fraction of
the intermediate inputs required to manufacture goods is located in different countries. As
a result, countries can now also specialize in different stages of the global supply chain. A
paradigmatic example of this fragmentation of production is the iPod, which is designed in
the United States and assembled in China from several hundred components and parts that
are sourced from around the world (Dedrick et al., 2010).
Figure 1 provides new evidence consistent with this unbundling of production. It reports
the ratio of the value of world exported intermediates to final goods. Before the mid-1980s
this ratio was about .5, which means that for each dollar of intermediate exported there were
two dollars of final goods exported. After the 1990s this ratio sharply increased and it has
converged to around .8. Therefore, trade in intermediates has grown much more than trade
in final goods. These findings are consistent with recent empirical work on the global supply
chain. For example, Antra`s (2014) shows that the average upstreamness of world exports
has increased, which suggests that trade in inputs has become more important over time.
Similarly, Johnson (2014) documents that the ratio of value-added to gross-value of exports
fell in early 1990s, which is mostly explained by increased offshoring within manufacturing.1
Trade affects the income and economic growth of countries.2 A vast and rich literature
has studied the effects of trade in goods. However, the trade literature has been mostly silent
about the distinctive long-run effects of trade in intermediates.3 This paper contributes to
filling this gap by providing a theory of how the unbundling of production changes the world
income distribution.
The key novel aspect of our theory is the introduction of intermediates that are hete-
rogeneous in their capital-intensity. In our framework, the unbundling of production leads
countries to sort in the production of intermediates according to their productivity levels.
High-productivity countries sort into the production of capital-intensive intermediates. This
prediction is supported by the data (see Table 1) and it is quantitatively important.4 Note
1Hummels et al. (2001) also document the emergence of global supply chains, which they refer as vertical
specialization, whereby countries specialize in the production of different sets of intermediate inputs. Hanson
et al. (2005) show that a sizeable part of this intermediate trade involves multinational firms.
2See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1993) and Ventura (2005) for an overview of the channels
through which trade affects economic growth.
3One exception is Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2010), which emphasizes the effects of offshoring on the allocation of
labor to innovation.
4We find that, if the productivity of a country moved from the 25th to the 75th percentile, the rise in
the value of exports of intermediates in the 75th percentile of capital-intensity would be 40% larger than the
increase in the 25th percentile.
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Figure 1: Ratio of Value of Exported Intermediates to Final Goods.
Source: Feenstra World Trade Database. To classify goods as intermediates, we use the
end-use classification of Feenstra and Jensen (2012). Final goods also include commodities.
also that this is consistent with the existing empirical literature (e.g., Schott, 2004).5
We show that unbundling of production gives rise to income differences among ex-ante
identical countries. For heterogeneous countries, we find that unbundling generates non-
monotonic changes in the world income distribution: top-bottom inequality increases and
the income share of the most productive countries rises mostly at the expense of middle-
productivity countries. It also increases within-country inequality for all countries. These
predictions are broadly consistent with the evolution of the world income distribution over
the last 25 years.
Our model features a large number of countries, which only differ in their productivity.
Each country produces a certain number of varieties. These varieties are differentiated by
origin (Armington assumption).6 In order to produce a variety, a bundle of intermediates
needs to be assembled. Each of these intermediates requires capital and labor in different
proportions. As it is standard in the trade literature, we assume that neither labor nor
capital are internationally mobile.
Intermediates differ in their capital-intensity requirements to be produced, while all vari-
eties are produced with the same technology. This assumption allows us to highlight the role of
heterogeneity in capital-intensity of intermediates. In fact, the dispersion in capital-intensity
is larger for more disaggregated goods. Using the direct requirements U.S. input-output table,
we show in Figure 7 and Table A.1 that the dispersion in capital-intensity at 6-digit NAICS
5See also Baxter and Kouparitsas (2003), Hanson (2012) and Schott (2003a,b) for similar findings.
6In the baseline model we assume that each country produces an exogenous number of varieties which is
proportional to the productivity of the country. Online Appendix C provides an exact microfoundation to the
exogenous number of varieties that we postulate in the baseline model.
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Figure 2: Market Structure for the 2-country, 2-varieties case
(a) Without Unbundling
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Note: Figure represents the market structure for two countries and two varieties under the two different trade
regimes. Dashed lines indicate trade flows.
level (which we interpret as intermediates) is larger than at 3-digit NAICS level (varieties).
Therefore, our formulation is an extreme representation of this fact.
We start characterizing the equilibrium without unbundling. When only trade in varieties
is possible, each country needs to produce all the required intermediates within its boundaries.
Once the intermediates are manufactured and bundled to produce the varieties, these varieties
are traded. The structure of this economy is summarized in Figure 2a for a two-country two-
variety case. We show that the country’s share of world income is determined by the share
of varieties the country produces, which is proportional to its productivity. For example, if a
country is twice as productive as another country, its share of world income is twice the share
of the other country.
The world income distribution changes with unbundling. When intermediates can be
offshored, the producer of a variety does not need to purchase all intermediates at home.
Rather, it can import intermediates from the cheapest producer in the world. Therefore, the
location of intermediates becomes endogenous. The structure of this economy is illustrated
in Figure 2b. We show that the most productive countries have comparative advantage and
specialize in capital-intensive intermediates. This endogenous selection of intermediates is
important because it determines the relative income of each country in the new steady-state.
We show that the world income share is determined by the mass of intermediates that a
country produces and their relative capital-intensity.
The first main result of the paper is that unbundling of production generates symmetry
breaking of ex-ante identical countries. To gain intuition into this result, we first consider a
two-country world. In the equilibrium without unbundling, the two countries have the same
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income share, as they produce the same amount of varieties. This symmetric equilibrium is
unstable when there is unbundling of production. To understand this result, let us assume
that the first country is slightly more productive than the second one. It implies that the
first country has a slight comparative advantage in capital-intensive intermediates and, thus, it
specializes in more capital-intensive intermediates. By producing more capital-intensive inter-
mediates, it accumulates more capital, thereby reinforcing the initial comparative advantage
in capital-intensive intermediates. This process continues over time and the two countries end
up with very different stocks of capital in the new steady-state. We show that this argument
extends to an arbitrary number of ex-ante identical countries. We also show that unbundling,
by changing the relative demand of capital, generates within-country inequality.
Our second main result characterizes the long-run change in the world income distribution
with heterogeneous countries. We show that top-bottom inequality rises with unbundling: the
world income share increases in high-productivity countries, while it declines in the rest. More-
over, this change is non-monotonic: the largest fall in income share is in middle-productivity
countries and the largest rise is in the most productive country. Without unbundling, the stock
of capital is determined by the number of varieties that a country produces. In contrast, with
unbundling, the number of varieties becomes irrelevant and the stock of capital only depends
on the intermediates in which the country specializes. The most productive country gains the
most because it specializes in the most capital-intensive intermediates. Middle-productivity
countries lose because they produce a sizeable amount of varieties, thereby accumulating a
substantial amount of capital in the equilibrium without unbundling. However, when there is
unbundling, they specialize in relatively low-capital-inensive intermediates and, thus, end up
with less capital. In other words, there is a large mismatch between the capital accumulated
during the equilibrium without unbundling and the capital needed to produce the equilibrium
mass of intermediates with unbundling. Finally, we also show that unbundling, by sorting
countries in the production of different intermediates, increases within-country inequality in
all countries.
In addition to analyzing and comparing the equilibria with and without unbundling, our
model is helpful to understand other substantial changes that have occurred in the process
of unbundling. An important fact in international trade is the increasingly important role of
emerging economies. For example, the share of world trade in developing Asia has increased
from less than 15% in the early 1990s to 35% in 2011. It has been argued that unbundling
of production explains the increase in the volume of trade in emerging economies (see, for
example, Baldwin, 2012). Figure 4 shows that most of the growth of world trade in intermedi-
ates has come from emerging countries. Motivated by this evidence, we study how the world
income distribution changes when the South joins the global supply chain. To be precise, we
analyze the effect of southern countries participating in intermediates trade in a world where
all countries previously traded varieties but only northern countries traded intermediates.
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We show that the income share increases in all northern countries and the most productive
southern countries, while it declines in the rest of southern countries. Northern countries
increase their income share the most because they can specialize in more capital-intensive
intermediates and sell them to a larger market. For southern countries, the income share only
raises in those that are productive enough to “climb up the supply chain” and specialize in
relatively capital-intensive intermediates.
We also use our framework to study the effect of a labor-saving technology: computeri-
zation. Computerization (or, more broadly, the Information Technologies revolution) is one
important factor behind the surge of the unbundling of production.7 Autor et al. (2003)
among others have also emphasized the effects of computerization on the relative demand for
labor and on the income distribution within countries. We introduce computerization into
the model as a technological shift that reduces the relative demand of labor-intensive inter-
mediates. We show that the effect of computerization depends on the trade regime. Without
unbundling, computerization does not change the world income distribution. In contrast, with
unbundling, computerization raises inequality. The intuition is that computerization changes
the selection of intermediates. All countries specialize in more capital-intensive intermediates,
thus, the average intermediate produced in each country is more capital-intensive. However,
this change in the trade pattern disproportionately favors the most productive countries,
which exacerbates income inequality. We also show that computerization raises the capital
income share in both trade regimes.
Finally, we analyze how the diffusion of technology changes the world income distribution.
In our baseline model we assume that productivity is exogenous and constant. However, in
practice, technology diffuses over time and low-productivity countries learn about innovations
done by the countries in the technological frontier. We show that diffusion of technology always
leads to convergence of income. However, for a given amount of technology diffusion, the mass
of low-productivity countries increasing their income share is larger with unbundling.
Related Literature. This paper relates to different strands of the literature on growth,
trade and offshoring. There exist a large number of models that study the interaction between
economic growth and trade. Our model structure for production of varieties and final good is
similar to Acemoglu and Ventura (2002). The most important difference is that we introduce
an additional layer of intermediates in the production process. This allows us to study the
effect of unbundling on the world income distribution. In contrast to Acemoglu and Ventura
(2002), we do not have long-run growth in our model because we have a collection of Cobb-
Douglas countries instead of their AK countries.8
7See, for example, Basco and Mestieri (2013) and the references therein.
8Other papers that study how trade in goods affect economic growth include Ventura (1997), Bajona
and Kehoe (2010), Baxter (1992), Cunat and Maffezzoli (2004) and Deardorff (2001b). These papers make
different assumptions on the number of goods and whether factor prices equalize. However, they do not consider
5
There exists a growing literature analyzing the unbundling of production and its effects on
the pattern of specialization and the wealth of nations. For example, Baldwin and Venables
(2013), Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2014) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) revisit
the standard trade theorems in the presence of trade in intermediates. We model the produc-
tion process as a sequential process in which intermediates are first produced and then used
to assemble each variety. This is similar to, among others, Antra`s and Chor (2013), Caliendo
and Parro (2012), Costinot et al. (2013), Deardorff (1998, 2001a) and Kohler (2004).Differ-
ently from these papers, we build a dynamic trade model and derive our main results from the
interaction between the sorting of countries across intermediates of different capital-intensity
and capital accumulation.
From a theoretical standpoint, as pointed out by Ethier (1984) and Costinot and Vogel
(2010), general equilibrium models with an arbitrary number of countries and goods seldom
provide tractable results. Our model provides a framework that accommodates a substantial
amount of heterogeneity and still delivers sharp characterizations and comparative statics re-
sults. There are two main sources of heterogeneity in our model. First, countries differ in their
aggregate productivity, a Ricardian feature. Second, intermediates are heterogeneous in their
capital-intensity, a Heckscher-Ohlin feature. We contribute to the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin
literature by showing how the presence of a continuum of traded goods with heterogeneous
capital intensities generates a unique steady-state world income distribution (even when dif-
ferences in productivity across countries are absent). This prediction is in contrast with the
case of a finite number of traded goods (e.g., Bajona and Kehoe, 2010 and Caliendo, 2011).
In terms of techniques, the characterization of the unbundling equilibrium relies in solving
for the equilibrium assignment in a similar manner as in Matsuyama (2013). As our produc-
tion functions are not linear in the factors of production, we cannot rely on the Ricardo-Roy
assignment literature (e.g., Costinot and Vogel, 2010).
In our model, unbundling of production generates symmetry breaking of ex-ante identical
countries. In this sense, it is related to, for example, Krugman and Venables (1995) and
Matsuyama (2004, 2013). However, our mechanism is different because it does not rely on
increasing returns or credit market imperfections. Matsuyama (2013) emphasizes that the
share of non-traded services is heterogeneous across varieties. With increasing returns in the
production of these non-traded services, this generates a two-way feedback loop that yields
symmetry breaking. In our model, similar countries become different with unbundling of
production because they specialize in different intermediates, which differ in capital-intensity
and this triggers different incentives to accumulate capital across countries. Our framework
shows that the emergence of symmetry breaking is linked to the unbundling of production,
rather than the fact that countries trade. Thus, in contrast to previous studies, we highlight
trade in intermediates. Yi (2003) calibrates a two-country two-stages Ricardian model to show that vertical
specialization is needed to explain how small trade cost reductions resulted in the observed growth in exports.
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the dynamic effects of countries specializing in the production of goods with heterogenous
capital-intensities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterizes
the equilibria with and without unbundling. The main results of the paper comparing the
world income distribution with and without unbundling are derived in Section 3. In Section
4.1, we analyze the empirically relevant case in which southern countries join the global supply
chain. Section 4.2 analyzes the effects of a labor-saving technology, computerization. Section
4.3 analyzes technology diffusion under the two trade regimes and Section 5 concludes. All
proofs can be found in the Online Appendix.
2 The Model
This section presents the baseline model and characterizes the steady-state equilibrium with-
out unbundling (when only trade in varieties is possible) and the equilibrium with unbundling
(when trade in both varieties and intermediates is possible).
We consider a world economy with J countries, indexed by j = 1, . . . , J. Countries only
differ in the level of productivity θj . Without loss of generality, we order countries such that
θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ ... ≥ θJ . There is a mass of varieties indexed by v ∈ [0, N ]. There is one final good
used for consumption and investment. There is no trade in final goods or assets.
All countries admit a representative consumer with utility∫ ∞
0
e−ρt ln cj(t)dt, (1)
where cj(t) is consumption in country j at time t. Each country j is endowed with an initial
capital stock kj(0) > 0 and a fixed stock of labor, normalized to one. The budget constraint
of the representative household in country j is
pj(t)
[
k˙j(t) + cj(t)
]
= pj(t)Yj(t) = rj(t)kj(t) + wj(t). (2)
We assume that varieties are differentiated by origin, and each country produces a measure
µj of these differentiated varieties, so that
J∑
j=1
µj = N, (3)
where N is the total number of varieties. In the baseline model we assume that the number
of varieties is exogenously given by µj = κθj , where κ > 0. It implies that more produc-
tive countries produce a larger number of varieties. Online Appendix C provides an exact
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microfoundation of this production function of varieties.
The final good is produced according to the constant returns to scale production function
Yj(t) = exp
(∫ N
0
1
N
lnxj(v, t)dv
)
, (4)
where xj(v, t) denotes the amount of varieties used in final good production in country j. The
production of varieties requires a bundle of intermediates, indexed by z ∈ [0, 1] ,
xj(v, t) = exp
[∫ 1
0
β(z) ln aj(z, v, t)dz
]
, (5)
where aj(z, v, t) denotes the amount of intermediate z used at time t to produce variety v
in country j. β(z) reflects the relative importance of intermediate z in the production of
variety v. We assume, for simplicity, that β(z) = 1. In Section 4.2 we study the effects of
computerization and make comparative statics on β(z).
Intermediates are produced using labor l and capital k in different proportions,
aj(z, t) = θj
(
kj(z, t)
z
)z ( lj(z, t)
1− z
)1−z
, z ∈ [0, 1], (6)
where aj(z, t) denotes total production of intermediate z at time t in country j and θj denotes
the productivity in country j.
2.1 Equilibrium Without Unbundling
This subsection analyzes the competitive equilibrium without unbundling. That is, when
varieties are traded but intermediates cannot be traded between countries. We characterize
the steady-state competitive equilibrium and show that the world income share of a country
is determined by the share of varieties it produces.
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium without unbundling is defined by a sequence of prices
{wj(t), rj(t), pj(t), pj(v, t), pj(z, t)} and allocations {lj(z, t), kj(z, t), cj(t), aj(z, v, t), aj(z, t),
xj(v, t)} for t = 0, . . . ,∞ and j = 1, . . . , J , such that for each country: (i) the representative
agent maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint, (ii) final good producers maximize
profits given prices, (iii) variety producers maximize profits given prices, (iv) intermediate
producers maximize profits given prices, (v) labor and capital market clear and (vi) trade in
varieties is balanced for each country.
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The consumer utility maximization problem (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) yields
c˙j(t)
cj(t)
=
rj(t)
pj(t)
− ρ, (7)
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtcj(t)−1
(
rj(t)
pj(t)
kj(t)
)
= 0. (8)
Equation (7) is the Euler Equation from a standard Ramsey model, with the price pj made
explicit, as it may differ across countries. Equation (8) is the transversality condition.
Omitting the time index t, the problem of the final good producer in country j is to
max
xj(v)
pjYj −
∫ N
0
pj(v)xj(v)dv,
where Yj is given by (4). It follows that
pjYj
N
= pj(v)xj(v).
Thus, as varieties are traded, the total demand of variety v is
x(v) =
J∑
i=1
xj(v) =
1
N
∑J
i=1 pjYj
pj(v)
. (9)
The problem of variety-v producer in country j is
max
aj(z,v)
pj(v)xj(v)−
∫ 1
0
pj(z)aj(z, v),
which implies that the demand of intermediate z to produce variety v is pinned down by
pj(z)aj(z, v) = pj(v)xj(v) = xj(v) exp
(∫ 1
0
ln pj(z)dz
)
.
Since there is not trade in intermediates, the aggregate demand of intermediate z in
country j comes only from the production of domestic varieties,
aj(z) = µjaj(z, v),
where µj is the number of varieties produced in country j.
The problem of the producer of intermediate z in country j is
max
lj(z),kj(z)
pj(z)θj (lj(z))
1−z kj(z)z − wjlj(z)− rjkj(z),
9
which implies the following labor and capital demands
(1− z)pj(z)aj(z) = wjlj(z), (10)
zpj(z)aj(z) = rjkj(z). (11)
Aggregating labor demand (10) across intermediates and noting that the labor supply is
normalized to one, we obtain the labor market clearing condition
1 =
∫ 1
0
lj(z) =
1
wj
∫ 1
0
(1− z)pj(z)aj(z)dz = 1
2
µj
∑
i piYi
N
1
wj
.
Likewise, using (11), the capital market clearing condition is given by
Kj =
1
rj
∫ 1
0
zpj(z)aj(z)dz =
1
2
µj
∑
i piYi
N
1
rj
.
To derive the trade balance equation, recall that without unbundling, only varieties are
traded. Thus, the value of exported varieties µjp
x
j (v)x(v, exported) (all varieties produced by
one country are symmetric) has to be equal to the value of imported varieties,
µj
N
(
J∑
i=1
piYi − pjYj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports of Varieties
=
N − µj
N
pjYj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imports of Varieties
. (12)
All final goods are produced using the same varieties by competitive producers in all countries,
thus, the prices of final goods are the same across countries pi = pj . Rewriting (12), we obtain
µj∑J
i=1 µi
=
pjYj∑J
i=1 piYi
=
Yj∑J
i=1 Yi
. (13)
From the factor market clearing conditions, we can write the labor and capital income in
country j as
wj =
1
2
κθj
∑
i piYi
N
, (14)
rjkj =
1
2
κθj
∑
i piYi
N
.
Using the trade balance equation (13) and the fact that the number of varieties produced
in country j is µj = κθj , we can express the world income share of country j as a function of
the exogenous levels of productivity9
9Note that in Eaton and Kortum (2002), the number of varieties is also proportional to the productivity of
the country. In their framework, the income share is also proportional to a re-scaled productivity measure in
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sj ≡ Yj∑J
i=1 Yi
=
θj∑J
i=1 θi
. (15)
This equation means that the relative income of country j is the relative productivity of the
country.
Steady-state solution In the steady-state there is no growth, k˙ = c˙ = 0. The Euler
condition implies that the interest rate is equalized across countries (i.e., rj = ρ). The
consumption level is determined by the budget constraint, cj = pjYj = wj +ρkj . Finally, note
that the country ranking in income shares coincides with the welfare ranking in steady-state.
2.2 Equilibrium With Unbundling
This subsection characterizes the equilibrium with unbundling. In this case, both varieties and
intermediates can be costlessly traded. This implies that countries no longer need to produce
all intermediates required to produce varieties. Rather, they can specialize in a subset of
these intermediates and import the rest. We show that the world income share depends on
the mass of intermediates in which the country specializes.
Definition 2 A competitive equilibrium with unbundling is defined by a sequence of prices
{wj(t), rj(t), pj(t), pj(v, t), pj(z, t)} and allocations {lj(z, t), kj(z, t), cj(t), aj(z, v, t), aj(z, t),
xj(v, t)} for t = 0, ...,∞, j = 1, ..., J , such that for each country: (i) the representative
agent maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint, (ii) final good producers maximize
profits given prices, (iii) variety producers maximize profits given prices, (iv) intermediate
producers maximize profits given prices, (v) labor and capital market clear and (vi) trade in
varieties and intermediates is balanced for each country.
To derive the equilibrium, we repeat the same steps as in Section 2.2. The demand of
varieties is given by (9), as in the previous section. The key difference is that since interme-
diates are now costlessly traded, the producer of variety v purchases intermediates from the
cheapest location. Thus, the price of variety v is given by
ln pj(v) =
∫ 1
0
ln
(
min
j∈{1,...,J}
{pj(z)}
)
dz.
This implies that the aggregate demand of intermediate z in country j, rather than coming
from the domestic demand as in the equilibrium without unbundling, comes now from the
entire world, provided that country j produces z at the cheapest world price.10 Thus, the
the zero-gravity case.
10We are implicitly assuming that each intermediate is done only by one country, which is indeed true almost
everywhere in equilibrium.
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mass of intermediates that each country produces is endogenously determined. Denoting by
Zj the mass of intermediates that country j produces in the unbundling equilibrium, we have
that
aj(z) =
J∑
i=1
µiaj(z, v) = Naj(z, v), if z ∈ Zj ,
and zero otherwise. Substituting the expression for aj(z, v) into equation (9) and using that
pj(v)x(v) = pj(z)aj(z, v), we find that the total value of intermediate z produced in country
j is
pj(z)aj(z) =
∑
i
piYi.
The expressions for the demand of labor and capital are as in the equilibrium without
unbundling, (10) and (11), adjusting for the fact that each country only produces a subset Zj
of the intermediates,
1 =
∫
z∈Zj
(1− z)dz 1
wj
J∑
i=1
piYi, (16)
Kj =
∫
z∈Zj
zdz
1
rj
J∑
i=1
piYi.
The trade balance changes with unbundling because now intermediates are also traded.
Trade balance implies that the value of exported varieties plus the value of exported interme-
diates has to be equal to the value of imports of any country,11
µj
N
(
J∑
i=1
piYi − pjYj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports of Varieties
+ Zj
N − µj
N
J∑
i=1
piYi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports of Intermediates
=
N − µj
N
pjYj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imports of Varieties
+ (1− Zj)µj
N
J∑
i=1
piYi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imp. of Intermediates
.
After rearranging terms, the above expression simplifies to
sj =
pjYj∑
i piYi
= Zj . (17)
This equation means that with unbundling the world income share of country j is only de-
termined by the mass of intermediates that the country produces. Note that a country is a
net exporter of intermediates when it specializes in a larger share of intermediates than the
fraction of varieties it produces (i.e., Zj >
µj
N ). It implies that unless Zj =
µj
N , there will be
11To derive the value of exported intermediates, note that, for a given intermediate z, each variety producer
demands 1
N
∑
i piYi. Given that country j produces µj varieties, the value of a given intermediate z that goes
into exporting is
N−µj
N
∑
i piYi. Finally, since country j produces the range Zj of intermediates, the total
value of exported intermediates is Zj
N−µ
N
∑
i piYi. The computation for the value of imports can be done in
an analogous way.
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an imbalance in intermediates trade and the income share will change with unbundling.
The productivity level of a country θj affects the income share (17) only through the
endogenous selection of intermediates Zj . The reason is that we assume that all value added
comes from the production of intermediates. We show in Online Appendix D that if some
intermediates cannot be traded (which is equivalent to introduce capital and labor as direct
inputs in the production of intermediates 5), then the productivity of a country also enters
directly in the income share equation (17).12 We choose to focus on comparing the two
extremes cases (intermediate are either traded or non-traded), instead of making comparative
statics in the share of traded intermediates, to better understand the distinctive effects of
unbundling. However, this alternative model could be used to perform a quantitative analysis
of the effects of unbundling, which we leave for future research.13
2.2.1 Steady-state solution
The final step is to derive the equilibrium share of intermediates that each country produces,
Zj . We proceed by focusing on the steady-state equilibrium.
From the Euler equation, (7), the rental rates are equalized across countries in the steady-
state, rj = ρ. Therefore, the cost of producing intermediate z in country j is
cj(z) = θ
−1
j w
1−z
j ρ
z.
This implies that the most capital-intensive intermediate (z = 1) is produced by the most
productive country, country 1, because c1(1) = θ
−1
1 ρ = minj{cj}.
Let p(z) = minj{cj}. Consider an intermediate z˜ < 1 with price p(z˜). Perfect competition
implies that
p(z˜)− cj(z˜) ≤ 0.
Then, if two countries produce the same intermediate it has to be the case that
cj(z˜) = ci(z˜) =⇒ θ−1j w1−z˜j = θ−1i w1−z˜i ,
12In particular, Online Appendix D shows that if only a fraction α of each intermediate z can be traded at
no cost, and the reminder fraction 1 − α has to be produced domestically, the income share of country j is
given by sj = (1−α) θj∑
j θj
+αj Zj , where Zj is the mass of traded intermediates produced in country j. Note
that when α = 0 this expression becomes the solution of the equilibrium without unbundling and when α = 1
the equilibrium with unbundling.
13From a theoretical standpoint, our unbundling equilibrium has the following additional property. The
income share (17) coincides with what we would obtain in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model in which the final
good is directly produced using intermediates, and only intermediates are traded. The trade balance would
be Zj
(∑
i piYi − Yj
)
= (1 − Zj)pjYj . Thus, our results for the unbundling equilibrium can be interpreted as
solving this equivalent dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model. It is in this sense that we claim to contribute to this
literature in the introduction.
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which implies that
wi
wj
=
(
θi
θj
) 1
1−z˜
.
Suppose that j > i, so that θj < θi. As
1
1−z is an increasing function of z, this implies
that country j will not produce any intermediate with z > z˜. Thus, we have a sequence of
thresholds zj that determines the pattern of specialization in intermediates,
wj
wj+1
=
(
θj
θj+1
) 1
1−zj
for all j. (18)
We have derived two equilibrium conditions relating the equilibrium wages and the equi-
librium thresholds: labor market clearing (equation 16) and the definition of the threshold
intermediate (equation 18). Using the ratio of both equations, we obtain the following en-
dogenous selection of intermediates.
Remark The endogenous selection of intermediates is given by the second order difference
equation,
(
θj
θj+1
) 1
1−zj
=
∆j
∆j+1
, (19)
where ∆j =
∫ zj−1
zj
(1− z)dz,
with terminal conditions z0 = 1 and zJ = 0.
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An implication of this endogenous selection of intermediates is that countries with rel-
atively high-productivity have comparative advantage in high z intermediates and export
capital-intensive intermediates. This is in line with the findings in Schott (2004), who doc-
uments that richer countries specialize in capital-intensive goods. Baxter and Kouparitsas
(2003), Hanson (2012) and Schott (2003a,b) also find similar results.15 We also provide addi-
tional evidence consistent with this pattern of specialization. Consider the following equation
Xict = α+ β · TFPc · Capital Intensityit + δit + δct + εict, (20)
where Xict is the log of total exports of intermediates i of country c at time t, TFPc is total
factor productivity of country c, δit, δct are intermediate-year and country-year fixed effects,
14Note that the left-hand side is continuous and increasing in zj and the right-hand side is continuous and
decreasing in zj . Therefore, the solution is unique.
15Bernard et al. (2006) find that U.S. manufacturing reallocates away from labor-intensive towards capital-
intensive plants within industries, as industry exposure to imports from low-wage countries rises. At a more
aggregate level, Davis and Weinstein (2001) and Romalis (2004) also provide evidence consistent with this
pattern of specialization.
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respectively. Our data is for the period 1994-2008. The prediction of the model is β > 0.
That is, relatively high-productivity countries have comparative advantage in capital-intensive
industries.16 Columns (1) to (4) in Table 1 report the coefficient β of the regression for different
sets of fixed effects. Consistent with the model, the coefficient is positive and significant at a
1% level in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Quantitatively,
our most conservative estimate, the interaction term in column (1), implies that increasing
TFP from the 25th percentile to the 75th, would increase exports in the 75th percentile
capital-intensive sectors a 18%. For the 25th percentile capital-intensive intermediates, the
increase would be a 13%.17 Thus, if TFP were to move from the 25th to the 75th percentile,
the increase in intermediate exports in the 75th percentile of capital-intensity would be a 40%
higher than the rise in those of the 25th percentile.
3 Main Results
This section compares the equilibrium with and without unbundling and derives the main
results of the paper. We first consider a world of ex-ante identical countries and show that
unbundling of production generates symmetry breaking. We next study a world consisting
of heterogenous countries and show that unbundling raises top-bottom inequality and that
middle-productivity countries experience the largest decline in income share. All omitted
proofs are in the Online Appendix.
3.1 Symmetry Breaking of ex-ante Identical Countries
To build intuition, we start analyzing the two-country case. Then, we characterize the equi-
librium for a world with an arbitrary number of countries.
3.1.1 The two-country case
Suppose that the world consists of two identical countries, J = {1, 2} with θ1 = θ2 = θ. In
the equilibrium without unbundling, each country has half of the world income share,
swithout1
swithout2
=
θ1
θ2
= 1.
16We classify goods as intermediates using the classification in Feenstra and Jensen (2012). Our data stops
in 1994 because prior to this year we do not have the same level of disaggregation. Note that we are making
the standard assumption that the ranking of capital-intensive industries is stable across countries, as our
capital-intensity data comes from the U.S. only. All data sources and definitions can be found in Table 1.
17The 25th percentile of TFP corresponds to Cameroon, with a measure of .274. The 75th percentile
corresponds to Israel, with a measure of .817. Note that Hall and Jones (1999) report TFP relative to the U.S.
TFP. For the sample period, the 25th percentile of capital-intensity corresponds to NAICS 313312 (Textile
and Fabric Finishing) with a measure of .271. The 75th percentile of capital-intensity corresponds to NAICS
327125 (Nonclay Refractory Manufacturing) with a measure of .373.
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In the equilibrium with unbundling, the endogenous selection of intermediates changes the
world income shares. The difference equation (19) determining the specialization threshold
becomes
1 =
1
2 −
(
z − z22
)
(
z − z22
) ,
where we have used the terminal conditions z0 = 1, z2 = 0 and θ1 = θ2 = θ. There exists
a unique solution to this equation given by z∗ = 1 −√1/2. That is, country 1 specializes in
the production of intermediates z ∈ (z∗, 1] and country 2 produces the rest of intermediates,
z ∈ [0, z∗). Thus, in the unbundling equilibrium, the relative income share of country 1
becomes
swith1
swith2
=
Z1
Z2
=
1− z∗
z∗
=
1√
2− 1 > 1. (21)
We have established the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider a world with two ex-ante identical countries. Without unbundling of
production, the income share of the two countries is the same. With unbundling of production,
the two countries end up with strictly different world income shares.
Equation (21) shows that the country that specializes in more capital-intensive inter-
mediates becomes richer in the steady-state with unbundling, even though the two coun-
tries have the same productivity. The intuition is that the country that specializes in more
capital-intensive intermediates accumulates more capital, which gives this country additional
comparative advantage in producing capital-intensive intermediates. There exists also a sym-
metric equilibrium, but it is unstable. Suppose we start with a symmetric equilibrium in
which both countries produce all intermediates in the same amount. Consider a small posi-
tive perturbation to the productivity of country 1. Country 1 gains comparative advantage
on the production of capital-intensive intermediates. Once country 1 starts producing more
capital-intensive intermediates, it accumulates more capital, which reinforces the pattern of
comparative advantage. Thus, even if the initial perturbation vanishes, country 1 retains the
comparative advantage in capital-intensive intermediates. Online Appendix B contains a for-
mal description of this perturbation argument. It also shows that the threshold equilibrium
we characterize is unique once we allow for arbitrary small perturbations in productivity.18
Another way to understand this result is that unbundling of production changes the pro-
duction function of countries. Without unbundling, all countries have the same aggregate
production function because they have the same productivity and they produce the same
intermediates. However, with unbundling, each country only produces a set of intermedi-
ates. Since these intermediates differ on capital-intensity, the capital share of the aggregate
18In Online Appendix D.2, we show that exactly the same thresholds solve the assignment when only a
fraction α of intermediates are traded. Thus, symmetry breaking occurs as long as α > 0.
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production function is larger in country 1. This causes that in the steady-state country 1 ac-
cumulates more capital. Therefore, both countries have the same capital without unbundling,
but country 1 accumulates more capital than country 2 in the equilibrium with unbundling.
Finally, we decompose the change in world income between changes in the relative la-
bor and capital income. If we compare labor and capital income between countries in the
equilibrium with and without unbundling, we have that
(
w2
w1
)with
−
(
w2
w1
)without
=
(
θ2
θ1
) 1
1−z∗
− θ2
θ1
= 0,(
ρk2
ρk1
)with
−
(
ρk2
ρk1
)without
=
z∗2
1− z∗2 −
θ2
θ1
< 0,
where we have used the definition of z∗ and that θ1 = θ2. In relative terms, the labor income
remains unchanged between countries with unbundling. Country 2 relatively loses in capital
income. The reason is that it specializes in relatively less capital-intensive intermediates,
thereby accumulating less capital in the steady-state.
World Output and Steady-State Welfare In the Online Appendix G.1 we derive the
total output produced in the world under the two trade regimes. By using that the final good
is the nume´raire, we show that the world output is the same with and without unbundling
and equal to
YWorld =
4θ2
ρ
.
The intuition for this result is that since the two countries have the same productivity, chang-
ing the allocation of intermediates does not change the aggregate production. Given that
the income share strictly changes with unbundling, it implies that the income in the ex-post
rich country increases, whereas the income in the ex-post poor country falls. It follows that
welfare in the steady-state unbundling equilibrium is higher in the ex-post rich country and
lower in the ex-post poor country.19
3.1.2 A world with a large number of ex-ante identical countries
The symmetry breaking result extends to a world with a large number of countries that are
identical in terms of their productivity, θ(j) = θ. In this case, equation (19) reduces to
∆j = ∆j+1 for all j = 1, . . . , J − 1.
19In order to do a complete welfare assessment, we would need to compute the transition between the two
steady-states. Thus, it could be that for very high discount factors, countries that reduce their steady-state
consumption with unbundling are better off. We note that for sufficiently patient agents the steady-state
income levels would be the only term pinning down the welfare gains of unbundling.
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Using the boundary conditions z0 = 1 and zJ = 0, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 Consider a world with J ex-ante identical countries in terms of their produc-
tivity level θ. Without unbundling of production, the world income share of each country is
identical and equal to 1/J. With unbundling of production, symmetry breaking occurs. Country
j specializes in the set of intermediates (zj , zj−1] with
zj = 1−
√
j
J
, (22)
and its world income share becomes
√
j
J −
√
j−1
J .
Note that the threshold in equation (22) is a decreasing and convex function of j. Thus,
while all countries have an equal share of the world income in the equilibrium without un-
bundling, inequality emerges among ex-ante identical countries in the equilibrium with un-
bundling. The trade balance equation (17) implies that the world income share of country j
is
sj = Zj ,
where Zj is endogenously determined from the specialization in intermediates and differs
across countries.
Zj = zj−1 − zj =
√
j
J
−
√
j − 1
J
.
This term is decreasing and convex, which means that countries that specialize in capital-
intensive intermediates have a higher income share.20
Lorenz Curve of World Output We can characterize the Lorenz curve of the world
income distribution using the expression of the world income shares,
L(j) =
j∑
i=J
si = 1−
√
j − 1
J
, j = 1, . . . , J,
which is an increasing and convex function. Note that the ordering of countries for the Lorenz
curve is descending in the country index j. It starts with j = J , with L(J) = 1−√1− 1/J ,
and it ends at j = 1, with L(1) = 1. These heterogeneous income shares are in contrast with
the complete equality benchmark in the equilibrium without unbundling, which has a linear
Lorenz curve, L(j) = j/J .
As in Matsuyama (2013), the model does not have a prediction as to which specific country
will occupy rank-j in the world economy, but it shows that endogenous inequality will emerge.
20The first derivative is proportional to j−1/2−(j−1)−1/2, which is negative for j > 1. The second derivative
is proportional to −j−3/2 + (j − 1)−3/2, which is positive for j > 1.
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Notice that a symmetric equilibrium (all countries produce equal shares of all intermediates
and, thus, have the same income) would also potentially be possible in this case. However,
the intuition for the two-country case carries over to this general case. The symmetric equi-
librium is not stable to small perturbations to productivity. As one country starts producing
more capital-intensive intermediates, it accumulates more capital, which reinforces the initial
comparative advantage in capital-intensive intermediates. Online Appendix B introduces for-
mally the equilibrium refinement concept of arbitrarily small perturbations to productivity.
It shows that under this refinement, our threshold equilibrium is unique up to permutations
in the country ordering.21
World Output and Steady-State Welfare Normalizing the price of the final good to
one, we show in Online Appendix G.1 that the total output produced in the world in the
steady-state equilibria with and without unbundling coincide. The world output is
YWorld =
2Jθ2
ρ
.
The intuition for the result is that, as all countries are technologically identical, the aggregate
world output does not change. Therefore, the differences in income shares sj generated with
unbundling of production inform us on the changes in level of steady-state consumption and,
thus, on steady-state welfare. It implies that the steady-state welfare rises in the countries in
which the income share increases, while it falls in the rest of countries.
Within-country Inequality We also analyze the emergence of within-country inequality.
The change in the Theil index in country j is22
∆Tj =
(
1− 1
2JZj
)
ln (2JZj − 1)− ln (JZj) .
The change in inequality has a U-shape in the country index j, with its minimum being equal
to zero at
j =
(1 + J)2
4J
.
21Note that the symmetry breaking result holds if we had assumed that varieties also differ on capital-
intensity requirements, lnYj =
∫ 1
0
βj(z) ln aj(z, v)dz provided that each country produced varieties with the
same distribution of capital-intensity requirements. The reason is that we assume that varieties are differenti-
ated by origin (Armington assumption). In this case, we would also have that ex-ante identical countries have
the same world output share in the equilibrium without unbundling. Unbundling of production would generate
symmetry breaking for the same logic as in the main text.
22Suppose we have N measures of income xi, i = 1, . . . , N , with arithmetic mean x¯. The Theil index is
T =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi
x¯
ln
(xi
x¯
)
.
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Thus, unbundling generically increases within-country inequality in all countries. The U-
shape of ∆Tj implies that the rise in within-country inequality is the highest at the extremes
of the support of the country indices.23 The recurrence equation (19) implies that the wage
bill is equalized across countries. Thus, all changes in inequality come through differences in
capital accumulation. Since the steady-state level of capital is monotonically decreasing in
the country index, this provides an intuition for the U-shape result in the change in within-
country inequality. The difference in income obtained from capital and labor is maximized
for the countries that accumulate the most and the least capital.
3.2 Heterogenous Countries
In this section we study how the world income distribution changes when countries are het-
erogenous and differ in their productivity level. We first consider a world that consists of
two countries and show that inequality increases with unbundling. Then, we show that this
result extends to a large number of countries and provide the additional result that middle-
productivity countries are the most likely to lose with unbundling of production.
3.2.1 The two-country case
Consider a world that consists of two countries with different productivity levels. Let us
assume that θ1 > θ2 and, without loss of generality, θ1+θ2 = 1. The threshold z
∗ that divides
the intermediates produced by each country is given by
A(θ, z) =
(
θ1
θ2
) 1
1−z
=
(1− z)2
z(2− z) = B(z).
The solution to this equation z∗ is unique. Moreover, z∗ is continuous and monotonically
decreasing with θ1/θ2. The reason is that the larger is the productivity difference between the
two countries, the larger is the share of intermediates that country 1 produces. Note that this
implies that inequality in the unbundling equilibrium is greater with heterogeneous countries
than with countries with the same productivity.
Proposition 3 Inequality between countries increases with unbundling of production.
23For the particular case of J = 2, the Theil index for country j becomes ∆Tj =
(
1− 1
4Zj
)
ln (4Zj − 1) −
ln(2Zj), which is .049 for country 1 and .275 for country 2. Note that if the production function of varieties
were a bundle of intermediates of z aggregated with weight β(z), such that the aggregate demand of capital and
labor does not satisfy
∫ 1
0
zβ(z)dz =
∫ 1
0
(1 − z)β(z)dz, inequality could decrease for some countries. However,
the U-shape result would still hold, and inequality would be maximized for the countries with the highest and
the lowest productivity.
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We can write the change in the relative income of country 2 between the two equilibria as
swith2 − swithout2 = z∗ − θ2.
The difference in relative income share is negative, which means that unbundling of production
leads to more inequality between the two countries. The reason is that the rich country
specializes in more capital-intensive intermediates, thereby accumulating more capital and
increasing the income gap between the two countries.
To better understand this result, we decompose the change in world income between
changes in the relative labor and capital income,
(
w2
w1
)with
−
(
w2
w1
)without
=
(
θ2
θ1
) 1
1−z∗
− θ2
θ1
< 0,(
ρk2
ρk1
)with
−
(
ρk2
ρk1
)without
=
z∗2
1− z∗2 −
θ2
θ1
< 0.
Country 2 relatively loses in both sources of income with unbundling. For relative wages, note
that unless the two countries have the same productivity (which is the case we analyzed in
the previous section), the new relative wage will be lower in country 2 (because z∗ > 0). For
capital income, country 1 specializes in more capital-intensive intermediates, thereby accu-
mulating more capital in the steady-state. Therefore, unbundling of production exacerbates
the inequality between the two countries both in capital and labor income.
World Output and Steady-State Welfare We can also compute the steady state levels
of world output for the case of two heterogenous countries (see Online Appendix G.2 for the
detailed derivations). We find that the expressions for world output in both steady-states are
YWorld, without =
2
ρ
θθ11 θ
θ2
2 ,
YWorld, with =
1
ρz∗(2− z∗)θ
1−z∗
1 θ
1+z∗
2 .
It is straighforward to see that YWorld, with > YWorld, without. Thus, world output increases
with unbundling. The reason is that in the unbundling equilibrium the more productive
country produces a larger set of intermediates, which is a more efficient use of resources and
it results in a higher level of world output. Welfare in the more productive country increases
with unbundling. Its income share of world output increases and world output also increases.
For the less productive country there are two opposite effects. On the one hand, the world
output increases with unbundling. On the other hand, its income share declines. In Online
Appendix G.2 we show that the latter effect always dominates and country 2 has a lower level
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of output and welfare in the steady state with unbundling.
3.2.2 A world with a large number of countries
Equation (19) characterizes the assignment of countries to the production of intermediates.
Unfortunately, equation (19) is not analytically solvable. To simplify the problem, we take
the same approach as in Matsuyama (2013). We approximate the solution to the case in
which the number of countries is very large, J →∞. In this case, equation (19) converges to
a second-order differential equation. Making parametric assumptions on the distribution of
θj allows us to solve the assignment problem.
Define a new country index ω = jε for ε > 0 and j = 1, 2, . . . , J . We proceed by taking
the limit ε→ 0 and J →∞ such that limε→0,J→∞ εJ = ω¯ ≤ ∞. Equation (19) becomes(
θω+ε
θω
) 1
1−zω
=
∆ω+ε
∆ω
. (23)
Taking Taylor series expansions around ε = 0 for the left-hand side of equation (23) we obtain
(
θω+ε
θω
) 1
1−zω
= 1 +
1
1− z(ω)
θ′(ω)
θ(ω)
ε+ o(ε)2.
Note that we are assuming that, as countries become arbitrarily close (ε → 0), so do their
productivities. In other words, we assume that θ(ω) is a smooth function with a well defined
derivative in its domain. For the right-hand side, we find that
∆ω+ε
∆ω
= 1 +
(
z′′(ω)
z′(ω)
− z
′(ω)
1− z(ω)
)
ε+ o(ε)2.
Taking the limit as J → ∞, so that all terms of order higher than ε are negligible, we find
that z(j) has to satisfy the following second-order differential equation
(1− z(ω))z
′′(ω)
z′(ω)
− z′(ω) = θ
′(ω)
θ(ω)
, (24)
with terminal conditions z(0) = 1 and z(ω¯) = 0.
We know from the equilibrium assignment that more productive countries specialize in
capital intensive (higher index z) intermediates, z′(ω) < 0. Thus, θ′(ω)z′(ω) > 0. Rearranging
(24), we find that z(ω) is convex, as z′′(ω) = (1− z(ω))−1(θ′(ω)z′(ω)/θ(ω) + z′2(ω)) > 0.
Notation change. In what follows, we abuse notation and use j to denote the continuous
country index ω.
The differential equation governing the assignment process (24) is a non-linear differen-
tial equation, which cannot be characterized in analytical form without making parametric
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assumptions on θ(j). To make further progress in the analysis, we specialize θ(j) to be a
distribution that approximates well the data. Our theory suggests that θj can be obtained
by looking at the distribution of TFP across countries or, alternatively, at the world income
distribution without unbundling, equation (15), which is also proportional to θj . Figure I.1
in Online Appendix reports the distribution of TFP and income per capita shares in 1988.24
We find that the exponential fit is remarkably good. The R2 of TFP on the country ranking
is .97, and .99 for income shares.25 Thus, we proceed making the following assumption.
Assumption 1 Countries’ productivity θ is exponentially distributed,
θ(j) = λ exp(−λj), j ∈ [0,∞).
Note that the most productive country, j = 0, has productivity level θ(0) = λ and pro-
ductivity is decreasing in j. Given this particular functional form, the differential equation
(24) becomes
(1− z(j))z
′′(j)
z′(j)
− z′(j) = −λ,
with terminal conditions z(0) = 1 and z(∞) = 0. Making the change of variables
v(1− z(j)) = d(1− z(j))
dj
= −z′(j),
equation (24) can be written as
v(1− z) (λ+ (1− z)v′(1− z) + v(1− z)) = 0,
where we have used that −z′′(j) = v(1−z)v′(1−z). There are two solutions to this equation.
The relevant solution is given by the terms inside the brackets (the other solution is to have
z(j) being constant, so that v(1− z) = 0). Integrating the terms inside brackets and applying
the boundary conditions, we can characterize the inverse of the assignment function,
j(z) =
z + ln z−1 − 1
λ
, (25)
which is monotonically decreasing in z. It is possible to invert this function and obtain z(j),
although the expression involves a transcendental function,
z(j) = −W (− exp(−1− λj)), (26)
24The election of 1988 is given by our data source, Hall and Jones (1999), which report TFP data for this
year. Note that it coincides with the change in trade regime documented in Figure 1.
25This fit is better than a Pareto, which yields an R2 of .8 and .69, respectively. We can also compute the
solution of the differential equation for the Pareto distribution.
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where W (z) is the Lambert W−function defined as the real solution of z = xex for x.
Proposition 4 The assignment function z(j;λ) is continuously decreasing and convex in j
and λ. The cross-partial derivative zj,λ is negative for all j < ¯(λ) and positive for j > ¯(λ).
Lorenz Curve of World Output With a continuum of countries, the income share of
country j becomes µ(j)/
∫
µ(j)dj in the equilibrium without unbundling and −z′(j) in the
equilibrium with unbundling. Integrating these shares, we obtain the Lorenz curves in the
equilibrium with and without unbundling
L(j)without =
∫ ∞
j
λe−λjdj = e−λj ,
L(j)with =
∫ ∞
j
−z′(j)dj = z(j),
where z(j) is given by (26). Note that the ordering of countries in the Lorenz curve is
descending in the country index j. That is, the Lorenz curve is zero for j = ∞ and one
for j = 0. Comparing the two Lorenz curves, we find that L(j)without > L(j)with for all
j ∈ (0, 1).26 Thus, the world distribution is more unequal with unbundling, as measured by
the Lorenz curve.
To better understand how the world income distribution changes throughout its support,
we next analyze the change in income shares country by country. Rewriting the change in
income shares as a function of the equilibrium assignment of intermediates j(z), (25), we
obtain 27
∆s(z) = zλ
(
1
1− z − e
1−z
)
.
The change in income share is negative for z ∈ (0, z¯) and positive for z ∈ (z¯, 1].28 Thus, the
income share declines in the countries assigned to the intermediates z < z¯ and it increases
in the rest. The next proposition characterizes the change in the world income distribution
as a function of fundamentals, rather than the endogenous variable z.
Proposition 5 The change in the income share from the equilibrium without unbundling
to the equilibrium with unbundling, ∆s(j), (i) is continuous in j, (ii) it is decreasing in j
for j < j− and increasing thereafter, with j− = λ−1 (−3W (3)− ln (1− 3W (3))), (iii) it is
26To see this, rewrite the Lorenz curves in terms of the assignment j(z), (25), so that L(z)without = ze1−z
and L(z)with = z, and the result follows.
27To derive this expression note that swithout(z) = λe
−λ
(
− 1+ln(ze
−z)
λ
)
= λze1−z. In addition, to express the
income share with unbundling, note that swith(j) = − dz
dj
⇐⇒ swith(z) = − 1dj
dz
. Using that dj
dz
= − 1−z
λz
,we have
that swith(z) = λz
1−z . The change in income share in terms of j is ∆sj =
λW (− exp(−1−λj))
1+W (− exp(−1−λj)) − λ exp(−λj).
28To see this, note that ∆s(z) is continuous, increasing for z ∈ (1 − 3W (1/3), 1] and decreasing otherwise.
Moreover, ∆s(0) = 0, d∆s
dz
(0) < 0, d∆s
dz
(1) =∞ and the result follows. Note too that ∆s(z) is convex for all z.
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Figure 3: Change in World Income Shares
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convex for j < jc and concave thereafter, with jc < j−, (iv) ∆s(0) = ∞, ∆s(∞) = 0 and
∆s(λ−1 (−W (1)− ln (1−W (1)))) = 0.
This proposition implies that (i) top-bottom inequality increases with unbundling and (ii)
the income share falls relatively more in middle-productivity countries. Figure 3 illustrates a
generic case. Without unbundling of production, the demand of capital is determined by the
number of varieties a country produces. In contrast, with unbundling, the demand of capital
is determined by the intermediates in which the country specializes. The most productive
country gains the most because it specializes in the most capital-intensive intermediates.
Low productive countries specialize in low-capital-intensive intermediates but they do not
lose much because they accumulated a small amount of capital in the equilibrium without
unbundling. The main losers are middle-productivity countries. These countries accumulated
a sizeable amount of capital in the equilibrium without unbundling. However, they now
compete against more productive countries and end up specializing in relatively low-capital-
intensive intermediates and, thus, with less capital and a lower income share. In other words,
there is a large mismatch between the capital they accumulated in the equilibrium without
unbundling and the needed to produce the equilibrium intermediates with unbundling.
Some of these predictions are in line with the observed changes in the world income distri-
bution between 1990 and 2008.29 Consistent with our model, top-bottom income inequality
increased during this period. For instance, the 90th percentile to 10th ratio of income per
capita rose from 24 to 28 and the 95th-5th ratio went from 38 to 42. To test the prediction
that the income shares of most productive countries increases while they declined for the
rest, we have regressed income per capita growth between 1990-2008 on the country’s TFP
ranking in 1988 from Hall and Jones (1999). We find that the coefficient of this regression
29We choose to finish at 2008 to exclude the effects of the Great Recession.
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is negative, which is supportive of our prediction. However, the coefficient is not precisely
estimated and it is not significant at conventional levels.30 Indeed, many other factors have
affected the world income distribution during this period and empirically disentangling the
effects of unbundling on the world income distribution is beyond the scope of this paper.
World Output and Steady-State Welfare We can also compute the steady state levels
of world output. To do so, we normalize the price of the final good to one and integrate the
price index substituting in the equilibrium prices (see Online Appendix G.2 for the detailed
derivations). We find that the expressions for world output in both steady-states
YWorld, without =
2
e
λ
ρ
,
YWorld, with =
√
e
λ
ρ
,
where e is the base of the natural logarithm, e = 2.718 . . . Thus, we have that YWorld, with >
YWorld, without. This result is not surprising. Unbundling allows a more efficient usage of
technologies in the world. Thus, world output increases with unbundling. This implies that
there exists some countries whose share of the world income decreases with unbundling that
enjoy higher steady-state welfare in the unbundling equilibrium. More precisely, we find that
countries with j ∈ [0, j+) increase their steady-state welfare in the unbundling equilibrium,
while all countries with j > j+ decrease their steady state welfare. The threshold country
has an index j+ = λ
−1 (−W (e3/2/2)− ln (1−W (e3/2/2))), which is strictly greater than the
threshold country that increases its world income share λ−1 (−W (1)− ln (1−W (1))) .
Within-country Inequality Finally, we analyze the changes in within-country inequality.
The change in the Theil index in country j is31
∆Tj = (1− z) ln (1− z) + z ln z + ln 2. (27)
It implies that the change in inequality has a U-shape in the country index, with a minimum
of zero at j0 = λ
−1(ln 2 − 1/2). Thus, within-country inequality generically increases with
unbundling. The U-shape of ∆Tj implies that within-country inequality increases as the
country index distances itself from j0. In other words, the most and the least productive
countries are the ones experiencing the highest increases in income inequality with unbundling.
Indeed, it can be readily verified that ∆Tj is maximized for j = {0,∞}. Finally, we note that
30Figure I.2 in the Online Appendix reports the distribution of the income per capita growth in this period
over the TFP ranking of the countries.
31To compute the Theil index, note that the wage bill paid in country j in the equilibrium with unbundling
is −z′(j)(1−z(j))Y , total payments to capital are −z′(j)z(j)Y and the average between the two is −z′(j)Y/2.
The Theil index for the equilibrium with unbundling is thus 1
2
(2(1− z) ln (2(1− z)) + 2z ln(2z)).
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the same U-shape result emerges when computing the Gini coefficient of each economy. The
Gini coefficient is zero for country j0, and it increases monotonically with |j − j0|.32
The U-shape prediction in the evolution of within-country inequality seems consistent with
the data. We find that for developing countries, the change in the Gini coefficient between
1988 and 2008 is increasing in the TFP ranking of the country.33 The coefficient is .09% and
statistically significant at a 5% level, which means that moving from the 50th to the 100th
position in the ranking, increases the Gini coefficient in 4.5% points. Figure I.3a in the Online
Appendix shows the scatter plot. For developed countries, we find that the relationship is
reversed and, consistent with the prediction of the model, changes in the Gini coefficient are
decreasing in the TFP ranking. However, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero
at conventional levels. Figure I.3b in the Online Appendix shows graphically this relationship.
One perhaps surprising feature of the TFP ranking by Hall and Jones is that Spain, Italy
and France are more productive than the U.S., Canada, Germany or Netherlands. Indeed,
as figure I.3b shows, these three countries are outliers in the regression. If we remove them,
we obtain a negative and significant coefficient at a 5% level. Finally, we want to stress that
many other factors such as taxation, technological change, etc. affect the income distribution
of a country. While this evidence paints a picture consistent with our theoretical prediction,
we do not attempt to identify the contribution of each different channel in this paper.
4 Extensions
In this section we make three extensions. The first extension studies the effects of southern
countries joining the global supply chain. The second extension analyzes the effects of a labor
saving technology, computerization, on inequality. In the last extension, we study how the
diffusion of technology changes the world income distribution.
4.1 South Joins the Global Supply Chain
One interpretation of the increasing importance of trade in intermediates is that southern
countries have joined the global supply chain (e.g., Baldwin, 2012). Figure 4 reports evidence
supporting this view. It decomposes the ratio of exported intermediates to final goods be-
32The change in Theil index for the particular case of two heterogenous countries (which we omitted in the
main text) is ∆T1 =
1
2
((1 + z∗) ln(1 + z∗) + (1− z∗) ln(1− z∗)) and ∆T2 = 12 (z∗ ln z∗ + (2− z∗) ln(2− z∗)) .
Note that within-country inequality increases in both countries. ∆T1 increases with z and ∆T1(z = 0) = 0,
thus, although the exact increase depends on the values of productivties θ1 and θ2, ∆T1(z
∗) > 0. Similarly,
∆T2 decreases with z and ∆T2(z = 1) = 0, thus, ∆T2(z
∗) > 0.
33For data comparability, we need to distinguish between developing and developed countries. Gini coeffi-
cients for developing countries are obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank), which does
not report time series for developed countries. For developed countries, we use Luxemburg Incomes Studies
data. The threshold between developing and developed countries is the 50% of the U.S. per capita income in
1990. We use the TFP ranking from Hall and Jones (1999).
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Figure 4: Ratio of Value of Exported Intermediates to Final Goods.
Source: Feenstra World Trade Database. To classify goods as intermediates, we use the end-
use classification of Feenstra and Jensen (2012). Southern countries are defined as countries
with GDP per capita (PPP) lower than 50 percent of the United States in 2000.
tween northern and southern countries. Note that trade in intermediates increased in both
northern and southern countries after late 1980s but the most dramatic increase was in south-
ern countries. For southern countries, the ratio was roughly constant around .2 before the
1990s, when it sharply increased and it has converged to around .8 in the late 2000s.
Motivated by this evidence, we analyze the effect on the world income distribution of
southern countries joining the global supply chain. We consider a world of J countries and
define as South the set of countries with a productivity level θ below θ. We compare two
equilibria. Before the South joins the global supply chain: all countries trade varieties but
only countries with productivity θ above θ can trade intermediates. After the South joins the
global supply chain: all countries trade both varieties and intermediates.
The equilibrium after southern countries join the global supply chain is the same as
in the baseline model (subsection 3.2.2). The income share of each country j is given by
safterj = −dzafter/dj, where the assignment of intermediates to countries is given by equation
(26).
The equilibrium income share before the South joins the global supply chain is a piece-
wise function that specifies the income share for northern and southern countries separately.
Southern countries are those with low productivity levels, that is, countries j > j, where j
= 1λ ln
(
λ
θ
)
. As southern countries only trade varieties, their income shares, implied by the
trade balance condition, are
sbeforej = θ(j) = λ exp(−λj), for j > j.
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Northern countries trade both varieties and intermediates. The trade balance of each
northern country j < j implies that34
sbeforej = −
dzbefore
dj
(
1−
∫∞
j µjdj∫∞
0 µjdj
)
, for j < j, (28)
where zbefore is the equilibrium assignment of intermediates when only northern countries
trade intermediates.
Therefore, we need to derive the equilibrium assignment of intermediates to compute the
income share of northern countries before the South joins the global supply chain. To derive
the assignment, we proceed in an analogous way as in Section 3.2.2 and solve equation (24)
with the terminal condition z(j) = 0. That is, the South (countries with j > j ) does not
participate in intermediates trade. The equilibrium assignment is given by
j = −1− z
before
λ
− C
∗
1 (j)
λ2
ln
(
1− λ(1− z
before)
C∗1 (j)
)
,
where C∗1 (j) is an integrating constant. We show in Online Appendix F.1 that zbefore(j; j)
is decreasing in j. This is illustrated in Figure 5a for two different j. It means that if
there are more countries participating in intermediates trade (j larger), each northern country
specializes in more capital-intensive intermediates (higher z). Finally, note that, by definition,
zbefore(j; j =∞) = zafter(j).
We can write the change in the world income distribution when the South joins the global
supply chain as
∆sj =
{
−z′(j)− λe−λj if j > j (Southern country),
−z′(j) + z′(j; j)(1− e−λj) if j < j (Northern country).
Proposition 6 When the South joins the global supply chain, all northern countries increase
their income shares. If j < j∗, southern countries with j ∈ [j, j∗] increase their income share
and the rest decrease their share, where j∗ = −λ−1 (W (1) + ln(1−W (1)). If j > j∗, the
income share of all southern countries declines.
The reason for these results is as follows. For southern countries, we have the same
comparison as in Section 3.2.2. Their income shares increase if they can produce more in-
34Denoting by ξj the amount of varieties produced by southern countries (i.e., ξj =
∑J
j=j µj), the trade
balance of northern countries j becomes
µj
N
(
J∑
i=1
piYi − pjYj
)
+ Zj
N − ξj − µj
N
J∑
i=1
piYi =
N − µj
N
pjYj + (1− Zj)µj
N
J∑
i=1
piYi.
Rearranging, sbeforej = Z
before
j
(
1− ξj
N
)
and taking the limit to a continuum of countries becomes (28).
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Figure 5: South joins the Gobal Supply Chain
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termediates than their share of varieties. Therefore, if the country is productive enough, it
produces enough intermediates and accumulates more capital participating in the global sup-
ply chain, thereby increasing its income share. For northern countries, there are two effects:
(i) selection effect: they produce less intermediates but they are more capital-intensive and
(ii) market size effect: northern countries sell intermediates to all the countries, not only in
the North. The overall effect is positive because northern countries specialize in more capital-
intensive intermediates and sell them to a bigger market. Figure 5b illustrates the change in
the world income distribution.
In this section, we have assumed, for simplicity, that southern countries either fully par-
ticipated or did not participate in intermediates trade. In Section H of the Online Appendix
we relax this assumption and we assume that a fraction α(j) of a country participates in
intermediates trade, where α(j) is a decreasing function of j. We show numerically that the
same qualitative results hold. As α(j) increases, the income share increases in countries with
j < j∗ and it decreases in the rest.
4.2 Computerization
The adoption of Information Technologies has been pointed out as one important reason
behind the unbundling of production (see, for example, Basco and Mestieri, 2013). Moreover,
Autor et al. (2003) among others have argued that computerization, by eliminating labor-
intensive tasks, has also changed the income distribution within countries. In this extension,
we analyze how the effects of computerization on the income distribution depend on the trade
regime.
As discussed in equation (5), a bundle of intermediates of different labor-intensity must
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be assembled to produce a variety v,
xj(v) = exp
[∫ 1
0
β(z) ln aj(z, v)dz
]
,
where β(z) is a weight on intermediate z, with
∫ 1
0 β(z)dz = 1. We model computerization
as a shift in the weighting function β(z) that reduces the weight of labor-intensive (low z)
intermediates.
More precisely, we assume that the distribution β(z) has a monotonically decreasing prob-
ability ratio (MPR), where the probability ratio is defined as
I(z) = β(z)
B(z)
,
and B(z) denotes the cumulative distribution of z.35 We assume that computerization induces
a shift in β(z) that can be ranked in terms of the probability ratio. Supposing that γ indexes
computerization, we assume that I(z; γ) is monotonically increasing in γ. Eeckhoudt and
Gollier (1995) show that a monotone increase in the probability ratio implies a first-order
stochastic dominant shift.36 Accordingly, we define computerization as an increase in γ. That
is, an increase in γ implies that, ceteris paribus, less relatively labor-intensive intermediates
are needed to produce each variety.
For example, one family of distributions satisfying the MPR ordering is given by
β(z) =
{
0 if z < γ,
1
1−γ if z ∈ [γ, 1],
(29)
where γ is the index of computerization. When γ = 0, there is no computerization and β(z) =
1, as we assumed in the baseline model. For γ > 0, the most labor-intensive intermediates
z < γ are no longer required to produce varieties.
In the equilibrium without unbundling, the income share of each country depends only
on the number of varieties and it is given by sj = µj/
∫
j∈J µjdj, which is independent on the
weighting function β(z). However, computerization decreases the demand of labor, which in
equilibrium increases the capital income share.
To analyze the equilibrium with unbundling, note that computerization changes the equi-
librium assignment. Proceeding as in section 3.2.2, the assignment function is characterized
35This condition has been applied in other economic contexts, see Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) and the
references therein. The normal, uniform and exponential distribution among other distributions satisfy this
condition.
36Moreover, they also show that a Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLRP) order implies MPR. Thus, MPR is
more stringent than first-order stochastic dominance but less stringent than MLRP.
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by the following differential equation
(1− z(j))
(
z′′(j)
z′(j)
+ z′(j)
β′(z(j))
β(z(j))
)
− z′(j) = θ
′(j)
θ(j)
= −λ.
Note that β(z) enters into the assignment function through its semi-elasticity, z′(j)β′(z)/β(z).
The solution to this differential equation with boundary conditions z(0) = 1 and z(∞) = 0
is given by37
j(z) =
1
λ
∫ 1
z
I(x, γ)(1− x)dx.
The income share in terms of z is
s(z) =
λ
I(z, γ)(1− z) . (30)
With unbundling, computerization changes the world income distribution. From equation
(30), we see that γ affects the income shares through the inverse probability ratio, I(z, γ), and
the equilibrium assignment z(j(γ)). On the one hand, by assumption, I(z, γ) is increasing in
γ, which reduces the income share. On the other hand, z(j(γ)) increases with γ, each country
j is now assigned to a higher z intermediate, which raises the income share.38 Therefore,
the overall effect on the income share (30) is ambiguous. The next Proposition shows that it
depends on the country ranking.
Proposition 7 In the equilibrium without unbundling, computerization does not affect in-
equality between countries. In the equilibrium with unbundling, computerization increases the
income share for countries with j ∈ [0, j1) and decreases it for countries with j > j2. If β(z)
is given by equation (29), an increase in γ increases the income share of countries j < j∗,
while it decreases in the rest. Computerization raises the capital income share in all countries
and both trade regimes.
Proposition 7 implies that top-bottom inequality unambiguously increases. The reason is
that all countries specialize in more capital-intensive intermediates. However, this shift in the
pattern of specializing disproportionately favors the most productive countries, which can now
specialize in even more capital-intensive intermediates. This is the reason why the income
share raises at the top. The least productive countries do not benefit from computerization
because β(z) does not change much at the extreme of the distribution.
To sum up, in this section we have shown that the effects of computerization on the world
income distribution depend on the trade regime. Without unbundling, computerization does
37Note that if β(z) = 1, we obtain that j(z) = λ−1(z − ln z − 1) as in the baseline model. Also, note that,
for simplicity, we are reporting the case in which the support of intermediates remains [0, 1]. Online Appendix
F.2 discusses the case when β(z) takes the form of (29), in which the support changes with computerization.
38Note from equation (4.2) that j(z, γ) increases monotonically with an increase in I(z, γ).
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not change the relative income of countries. In contrast, with unbundling, computerization
leads all countries to specialize in more capital-intensive intermediates, which exacerbates the
income differences between countries. Moreover, computerization always raises the capital
income share. This empirical prediction is consistent with the finding of Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2013) that the labor-share has declined in most countries.
4.3 Diffusion of technology
The source of comparative advantage in our model is technology. In the baseline model
we assumed that technology is exogenous and constant. However, technology diffuses over
time and low-productivity countries eventually learn the innovations that the countries in
the technological frontier make. In this section we analyze how the diffusion of technology
changes the world income distribution with and without unbundling.
We assumed, consistent with the data, that productivity follows an exponential distribu-
tion
θ(j) = λ exp(−λj).
We model technological catch-up of low-productivity countries as a decline in the parame-
ter λ from λ1 to λ2 < λ1. This implies a first-order stochastic shift in the distribution of
productivities in the world.39
Proposition 8 Diffusion of technology leads to convergence in income with and without un-
bundling. Moreover, the income share increases in more low-productivity countries when there
is unbundling of production.
These results are illustrated in Figure 6. Without unbundling of production, the in-
come share of country j is swithoutj = θ(j). Note that changes in productivity directly affect
the income share. It is then straightforward to see that the income share increases in low-
productivity countries (j > j) and declines in the rest (j < j).40 Therefore, diffusion of
technology leads to convergence in income shares.
With unbundling of production, the income share of country j is swithj = −z′(j). It means
that productivity affects the income share through the endogenous assignment of intermedi-
ates. To understand the effect of technology diffusion on the income share, first notice how
39Note that this formulation implies a counterfactual decline in the TFP level of the most productive coun-
tries. We choose this formulation for notational convenience. It can be verified that the same results on income
shares apply if we define technological catch-up as a change only in the slope of the original exponential func-
tion, θ(j) = λ exp(−(λ − ξ)j) with ξ > 0. This formulation would avoid reducing TFP in absolute levels for
the most productive countries. However, the same results go through in terms of income shares because, in
relative terms, we still have a decline in TFP for the most productive countries and the assignment function
would remains unaltered as θ′(j)/θ(j) = −λ+ ξ.
40Using that θ(j) follows an exponential distribution, the threshold j is j =
ln
(
λ1
λ2
)
λ1−λ2 .
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the assignment function changes,
∆j =
(
1
λ2
− 1
λ1
)
(z − ln z − 1) > 0.
This change in the assignment function implies that low-productivity countries are climbing up
the ladder of global supply chains by producing higher z intermediates. This new selection of
intermediates results in an increase in the income share of low-productivity countries (j > j†)
and a decline in the rest (j < j†). The reason is that, due to the diffusion of technology, low-
productivity countries can now produce more intermediates, thereby increasing their income
share. This result implies that diffusion of technology leads to income convergence.
Finally, we compare the changes in the world income distribution under the two trade
regimes. It is straightforward to check that
∂swithj
∂λ
∣∣∣j=j < 0.
This inequality implies that j > j†, which means that in the equilibrium with unbundling
the income share increases for a larger mass of low-productivity countries. In particular,
the income share of countries with j ∈ (j†, j) raises with unbundling but falls without un-
bundling. The intuition is that, in the equilibrium with unbundling, the relative productivity
(not the absolute level) determines the assignment of intermediates. The slope of the distri-
bution of productivities flattens with the diffusion of technology, which results in countries
with productivity j ∈ (j†, j) gaining comparative advantage against nearby more-productive
countries, which allows them to climb the supply chain ladder and produce relatively more
capital-intensive intermediates.
To sum up, in this section we have shown that diffusion of technology leads to convergence
in income under the two trade regimes. However, the mass of low-productivity countries
benefiting from technological catch-up is larger in the trade equilibrium with unbundling.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a framework to study how the international unbundling of
production changes the world income distribution. In our setup, countries only differ in their
productivity. Each variety requires a bundle of intermediates, which use capital and labor in
different proportions.
We showed that in the steady-state without unbundling (only varieties are costlessly
traded), the world income share is determined by the fraction of varieties that each coun-
try produces. This world income distribution changes with unbundling (intermediates can
also be traded). The world income share of a country depends on the intermediates in which
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Figure 6: Change in the World Income Distribution with a change in λ
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each country specializes.
Our first main result is that unbundling of production brings about symmetry breaking.
That is, countries with the same productivity have the same income in the equilibrium without
unbundling. In contrast, unbundling of production leads to divergence in income levels. The
intuition is that arbitrarily small differences in productivity translate into comparative advan-
tage differences in capital-intensive intermediates. Specialization in capital-intensive interme-
diates, induces capital accumulation, thereby reinforcing the initial comparative advantage.
As a result, specialization in capital-intensive intermediates increases the capital-labor ratio
of a country, which translates into a higher income share. We also show that within-country
inequality emerges with unbundling.
Our second main result is to show that unbundling of production raises top-bottom in-
equality and it generates non-monotonic changes in the world income distribution. The largest
fall in income shares is in middle-productivity countries. The reason is that the most produc-
tive countries specialize in capital-intensive intermediates and, thus, accumulate more capital
and become relatively richer. Middle-productivity countries lose relatively more because they
produce a sizeable amount of varieties and, thus, they accumulated a considerable amount of
capital in the equilibrium without unbundling. However, with unbundling, the stock of capital
only depends on the intermediates in which the country specializes. Since the country has in-
termediate productivity, it specializes in relatively low-capital-intensive intermediates. Thus,
it accumulates relatively less capital and it ends with a lower income share. Within-country
inequality also increases in our set-up.
We showed that when southern countries join the global supply chain (participate in
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trade in intermediates), the income shares of all northern and the most productive southern
countries increase, while they decrease for the rest of southern countries. The reason is that
northern countries specialize in more capital-intensive intermediates and sell them to a larger
market. However, only productive enough southern countries are able to climb up the ladder
of global supply chains to specialize in sufficiently capital-intensive intermediates.
We also analyze how the effect of a labor-saving technology, computerization, depends on
the trade regime. Without unbundling, computerization has no effect on the world income
distribution. In contrast, with unbundling, computerization exacerbates inequality between
countries. The reason is that with computerization all countries specialize in more capital-
intensive intermediates, which disproportionately favors the most productive countries.
Finally, our model predicts that diffusion of technology leads to income convergence. How-
ever, the mass of countries benefiting from technological catch-up is larger in the trade equilib-
rium with unbundling of production. The reason is that in these countries relative productivity
declines, which reduces the income share without unbundling. However, relative productivity
falls less than in their nearby more-productive countries, which allows them to produce more
capital-intensive intermediates and increase their income share with unbundling.
The unbundling of production is exogenous in the model. Nonetheless, in practice, firms
adopt technologies (for example, computers and the internet) to be able to offshore part of
the production process. We plan on extending our framework to analyze the interdependence
between technology adoption and trade. We have only considered two factors of production:
capital and labor. Although we think of capital in broad terms, which could also include
human capital (along the lines of Matsuyama, 2004), a more careful investigation of the
distinctive effects of human capital accumulation would be another interesting extension of
the model. Lastly, in our baseline model, we assume that intermediates are either costelessly
traded or non-traded. Online Appendix D shows that our framework can be extended to have
an arbitrary fraction of intermediates being traded. In future work, we intend to quantitatively
investigate the effects of changes in the fraction of intermediates traded on different long-run
and short-run trade elasticities.
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A Tables and Figures
Table 1: TFP and Exports in Labor-Intensive Industries
Xict = α+ β · TFPc · Capital Intensityit + δct + δit + εict
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFPc · Capital-Intensityi 0.88 1.82 1.82 2.77 2.75
(0.26) (0.41) (0.41) (0.62) (0.62)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
NAICS3 Fixed Effects Yes No No No No
NAICS6 Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*Country FE No No Yes No Yes
Year*NAICS6 FE No No No Yes Yes
Observations 207,320 207,320 207,320 207,320 207,320
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at country level. Xict is the log of world exports of intermediates i of
country c in year t from 1994 to 2008. Our data is disaggregated at 6-digit NAICS. We classify intermediates
using Feenstra and Jensen (2012) classification. TFP is from Hall and Jones (1999) in 1988. Capital-intensity is
measured as capital shares, which are computed from the NBER CES manufacturing industry database following
their definition: αk = 1 −
∑
i∈I αi, where I denotes production workers, non-production workers, energy and
materials. Our data stops in 1994 because prior to this year we do not have the same level of disaggregation.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Capital-Intensity for Intermediates and Varieties
Notes: We define variety as a 3-digit NAICS and intermediate as a 6-digit NAICS (the highest level of
disaggregation available). To construct the histograms we compute demeaned measures of capital-intensity.
Capital-intensity of a variety is the difference between the weighted average of the capital shares of the inter-
mediates used to produce the variety and the capital share of the average variety. Similarly, capital-intensity
of an intermediate is the difference between the capital share of the intermediate and the capital share of the
variety that uses the intermediate. Capital shares of intermediates are computed from the NBER CES manu-
facturing industry database following their definition. We use the 1997 direct requirement U.S. Input-Output
tables from the BEA to impute the weight of each intermediate in the production of each variety. We report
the results for year 1990 (the year around which we assume the unbundling of production started). We obtain
the same qualitative results for year 2000. Table A.1 in the Online Appendix provides additional measures of
capital-intensity dispersion (standard deviation, interquartile range and range).
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